The susceptibility of WiFi networks to Rogue Access Point attacks derives from the lack of identity for 802.11 devices. The most common means of detecting these attacks in current research is through tracking the credentials or the location of unauthorised and possibly malicious APs. In this paper, the authors outline a method of distinguishing WiFi Access Points using 802.11 MAC layer management frame traffic profiles. This system does not require location estimation or credential tracking techniques as used in current research techniques, which are known to be inaccurate. These characteristic management traffic profiles are shown to be unique for each device, tantamount to a MAC identity. The application of this technique to solving Rogue AP attacks under the constraints of an open access, public WiFi environment is discussed with the conclusion that the identity is practically very difficult to forge.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most insidious attacks perpetrated against WLAN networks is the Rogue Access Point (Rogue AP), whereby an attacker masquerades as a legitimate AP in order to compromise the security of unsuspecting clients. These types of attack are considered to be some of the most dangerous threats to WiFi (Shetty et al., 2007) . (Ma et al., 2007) categorises Rogues AP into one of four classes;  Improperly configured AP,  Unauthorised AP,  Phishing AP,  Compromised AP.
Detection of unauthorised APs is the most common class addressed by research into Rogue APs (Beyah et al., 2004) . The existence of poorly configured APs in practice is outlined in (Percoco, 2010) , where "poor security settings" is one of the top two threat vectors in practical cyber security instances. Investigations into detecting phishing and compromised APs are lacking in current research, although they are considered a technically difficult but growing threat (Percoco, 2010) .
One of the most common measures of identity in WLAN systems in current research is the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) of packets. The authors in (Tao et al., 2008) and (Faria and Cheriton, 2006) suggest that, using a distributed set of sensors, sufficient RSSI data can be gathered to provide identification. This relies on different physical locations creating slight variations in traffic patterns; however this is only applied to clients and not APs.
There is disagreement on the usefulness of RSSI in practical experiments. The authors in (Faria and Cheriton, 2006) and (Ma et al., 2008) conclude that use of RSSI as a WLAN location indicator is flawed as multipath effects and AP specific processing of RSSI frame values severely impact results and make them unreliable. Furthermore, in (Nagarajan et al., 2010) , it is suggested that attackers, knowing RSSI is used as a detection metric, can alter their transmission power in frequent intervals in order to defeat the detection algorithm. Thus the usefulness of RSSI as a metric for absolute identification in Rogue APs is uncertain and a more robust identification method is required.
In (Shrivaraj et al., 2008) packet inter-arrival time is used to detect Rogue APs using a Hidden Markov Model, however the results are based on Layer 3 information, not Layer 2. A similar system is proposed in (Franklin et al., 2006) where interframe spacing between probe requests in a WLAN is suggested as an indicator of the device driver in use, although it has only been applied to clients rather than APs. The distinction between clients and APs here is important, as the traffic handled by a client is addressed to them alone, while inter-arrival times for APs may be affected by having to process frames for other network users. The use of layer 2 frame interarrival times to identify DoS attacks in WiFi networks has already been shown by the authors (Milliken and Marshall, 2012) . A more reliable technique for detecting Rogue APs is alluded to in (Beyah and Venkataraman, 2011) as "Irrefutable device identification through traffic characteristics".
AP IDENTITY AT LAYER 2
Identity in the context of this work is defined as the ability to distinguish between two devices based on intrinsic attributes which are not reliant on their reported identity, i.e. the MAC address. Thus whilst it is possible for a malicious attacker to copy the MAC address, it should be impossible for them to copy these intrinsic device attributes.
The use of Layer 2 management frame traffic from WiFi networks has many positive attributes for research applications. Firstly, this traffic is broadcast in plaintext in all networks. As this Layer 2 traffic is devoid of any encryption, this means it can be collected without any privacy or confidentiality concerns, which is often a major barrier to performing live WiFi network investigations.
Previous work by ) outlined a Layer 2 data collection system which has been deployed in live environments for traffic analysis and security research. Using this traffic it is possible to investigate identity at WiFi Layer 2. This dataset was collected from a public, open-access WiFi rollout in the Sunway Pyramid shopping mall in Kuala Lumpur (Figure 1) . Table 1 presents a breakdown of management frame metrics for 3 APs within range of MS#1 in Figure 1 . The two most common management frame types are considered to be; Beacons and Probe Request / Response exchanges. An exchange is is complete if the request and reply conversation is complete, i.e. both the request and response have been received correctly .
Exchange intervals (for probes) and packet interarrival times (for beacons) can be calculated by a client based on the traffic from an AP and is dependent on two unique factors; AP processing time and client-AP channel.
AP processing time concerns the time for an AP to process and transmit a packet and depends on the equipment, firmware and load at that point in time.
The combination of these factors means that processing time is subtly different for every AP and can be used as a basis for prescribing an AP identity. The client-AP channel factor concerns the subtle differences in packet reception depending on proximity between a client and AP. The authors have previously demonstrated in (Milliken and Marshall, 2012) and that data collected from different locations is statistically different even if these locations are in very close proximity, as in Figure 1 . This alters how the traffic is received at each observation location, which can be used as a further basis for identity. Information from Table 1 shows that, as predicted, many of the traffic attributes are distinct for each AP (AP#1 vs. AP#2 vs. AP#3) collected at a specific observation location (MS #1). The "running" average (Av.) values in Table 1 represent the exponentially weighted moving average, where each new interval is weighted against the previous intervals without any being discarded. This makes the average more resistant to minor outliers. To combat major outliers, a removal threshold (>60s) has been applied to improve the stability of the mean. Exchanges of this length are deemed to be erroneous factors attributed to excessive impulse interference or temporary reflective agents. Figures  2 and 3 show the values of these running means for Beacon intervals and Probe Exchange time intervals over the first 500 observations (i.e. captured frames) for MS#1 in the K1 dataset. The first conclusion from the data is that beacons present a high degree of variance. This is attributed to their constant broadcast nature making them more sensitive to interference. Probe information is very stable which is attributed to their scarcity relative to beacon frames. Since probe frames are less frequent than beacons, their transmission over the air is less likely to coincide with impulse interference.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 (MS#1) to Figures 4 and 5 (MS#2) it is observed that although the average values are different, the general characteristics for each frame type are consistent, i.e. the frame averages display a settling time, followed by a smoothly changing average which may overlap with other observed averages for other APs at different times. This confirms that these attributes can be tracked over time and that they are not the same at all observation locations.
ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT
From Figures 2-5 it is possible to visually differentiate between each of the APs and each observation location (MS). However reliance on visual distinction could result in disagreement between different observers as to what constitutes legitimate separation between the APs. A more reliable, repeatable and programmable method is applied here to systematically determine the distinction between the AP frame averages.
Training Period Estimation
Each of the averages in Figures 2-5 exhibits a training period, after which minor outliers will have been absorbed and a settled mean is achieved. Once the end of this period has been reached then the trace stabilises and exhibits smooth transitions. This interference is considered distinct from that removed by the (>60s) outlier threshold outlined previously. The less extreme transitions may reflect changes in client loading or the state of the network environment such as greater footfall acting as reflectors. The training period is governed by the following algorithm: 1. Calculate the current "running" mean and standard deviation of the intervals observed, 2. Establish the maximum and minimum limits of accuracy for training period (here they are chosen as 10% of the standard deviation), 3. If the running mean is observed as being within the training bounds for 10 consecutive observations, the training period is deemed to have ended. The values of 10% for the accuracy of the standard deviation and 10 consecutive observations of conformity are applied here based on human observations of multiple traces. The impact of varying this value has been investigated and the choice of 10% and 10 observations closely matches visual estimations. While this continues to introduce human error, since an observer could select 11% rather than 10% or 20 rather than 10 observations and get different results, this approach instead reduces the debate to accuracy rather than repeatability. Applying this algorithm to the traffic for MS#1 and MS#2 produces Table 2 , which outlines the estimated end-point of the training times for each AP. These training times are exclusive to this dataset and collection time however this process can be applied to other datasets or APs. Thus is more flexible and reliable than using human estimation.
Each of the AP mean interval traces for each MS exhibits a unique settling point after a set amount of observations. The range of this observation value can extend from as few as 47 and as many as 181 depending on the relative stability of the averages observed. An anticipated time until these numbers of observations are achieved is given in Table 2 , based on the average observation rate at each AP. This indicates that the beacon rate settling is relatively prompt due to the high frequency of the packets whilst probe rate settling takes longer.
Distinction Period Estimation
The end of the training period establishes the number of observations after which the AP averages can be considered stable. Due to the possibility of drift however it is not necessarily the case that APs can be distinguished at all times, so identity may not be available at all times. The algorithm employed to determine AP distinction is: 1. Determine the upper and lower limits for the mean of each AP by adding and subtracting a proportion of the current standard deviation from it (10% here), 2. If the upper bound for AP1 is below the lower bound of AP2 then they are distinct at that observation, 3. Alternatively, if the lower bound for AP1 is above the upper bound of AP2 then they are distinct at that observation, 4. If the AP under consideration is both settled and distinct from all other APs under test then identity is considered to be prescribed for that AP at that time for that observation location. This process provides a quantifiable means of determining if APs are distinguishable and over what percentage of the operating time, which is shown in Table 3 . The information in the table indicates that the APs can be distinguished for up to 99% of the total observations for both probes and beacons. The distinction results are less impressive for probe exchanges, for which the ability to separate the APs drops to as low as 12% for AP#2 -AP#3 in MS#2. This indicates that some locations may exhibit black spots for frame reception. The disparity in the distinction results for MS#1 and MS#2 in Table 3 shows that difference in placement location plays a key role in the application of this identity system. The observation locations of MS#1 and MS#2 are quite close in proximity yet the orientation difference between the two provides sufficiently different data to allow identity prescription. This indicates that searching for a suitable location within the deployment environment has a critical effect on the ability to prescribe identity. Investigations of how to select these positions are considered for future work. Combination of more than one detector in an environment would bypass this deficiency, as shown by the different performance levels per MS location.
Each of the routers tested have been produced by a different manufacturer. The authors have no reason to believe that any devices exist for which this technique does not apply, although testing is necessarily limited by the environment available. The testing environment is believed to be a typical representation of open access networking environments and hence the results from this work should be broadly applicable.
Rogue AP Discussion
This experiment demonstrates that live network environments contain subtleties in traffic reception that can be used for security research. Due to the live, operational nature of the network under test it was not possible to obtain permission to carry out a Rogue AP attack at this location. Nonetheless the information available provides insight into the effectiveness of the system under Rogue AP attack.
The beaconing rates for each of the APs in Figures 2-5 are set to 100ms intervals. Each device is attempting to broadcast beacons at precisely this interval, however due to processing and channel characteristics they exhibit unique traffic deviations from the viewpoint of any connected client.
Over both monitoring locations (MS#1 or MS #2) the distinction level between these APs was discernible between 75% and 99% of the testing time. This is in spite of the mean values for Figures 2-5 for APs 1 and 2 being visually very similar. This demonstrates that small differences in beaconing interval are perpetuated over time and are an identifying factor of the device itself.
A similar feature can be attributed to probe exchange intervals. For every AP, probe responses will be replied to as soon as possible, rather than at a set rate (as with beacons). This is more likely to be susceptible to variation due to loading in the AP, since processing will slow as additional tasks need to be carried out concurrently, e.g. serving multiple connected clients. It is particularly evident in Figure  3 that these response levels are quite different and stable over time, allowing for minor fluctuations.
The identity system proposed here would be very difficult for a knowledgeable attacker (one who knows the detection criteria) to combat. It has been demonstrated here that location plays a key role in the observed identity characteristics. It would be very difficult for any Rogue AP to masquerade this information, as they would have to be in exactly the same physical position as the legitimate AP. Even were this to be achieved, the differences in frame processing of different manufacturers would need to be discovered and masqueraded as well. At worst this raises the bar for potential Rogue AP attacks.
In practice a client could employ this technique to detect Rogue APs using the following method: 1) Client connects to a legitimate AP, 2) After the training time has bypassed the client has created the AP fingerprint, 3) Should a Rogue AP now appear, the client will be able to distinguish the new fingerprint even if the Rogue AP masquerades all available attributes of the legitimate AP. This process would have to be carried out every time a client connects to an AP, even if the fingerprint has been previously known. Only one visit to an AP is required to generate the fingerprint, however due to the channel characteristics changing with location and time they must be generated on every new connection. Accounting for user mobility remains for future work. This technique could be used in addition to alternative Rogue AP detection techniques to improve detection confidence.
CONCLUSIONS
Rogue APs present a significant threat to public WiFi infrastructures and their users, which current detection systems aim to defeat by monitoring differences in RSSI. These systems are shown to be insufficient by other research works. This work presents a new method of determining identification for WiFi APs, employing a combination of WiFi packet average intervals for beacons and probe exchanges to gauge identifying averages for APs.
This layer 2 information has been shown to be received differently at different distances and orientations to the source of the traffic, which can be used to attribute identity to a specific AP from that collection location.
The fingerprinting technique employed here is dependent on two characteristics, 1) AP -user channel and 2) Internal AP processing. Assessing the relative contribution to fingerprinting of these two attributes remains for future work. Attribution of this identity system has been shown to be available in a live location for up to 99% of operational lifetime potentially within 9 seconds of client-AP connection.
